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The End of Voluntarism:
Herbert Hoover and the
National Credit Corporation
James S. Olson
IN THE AUTUMN OF 1931 the United States experienced
the most serious economic and financial crisis in its history.
The banking system inevitably suffered as factory production,
commodity prices, securities prices, and bank deposits all
dropped precipitously. Even before the crash the banks had
been weakened by ineffective state regulation, mismanagement,
decreasing proportions of liquid assets, and overinvestment in
speculative securities. Great Rritain's decision, on September
21, 1931, to abandon the gold standard further intensified the
banking crisis, causing frightened European financiers to un-
load their American securities and withdraw gold from the
country. Bank suspensions had already surpassed all previous
records, and national confidence in the banking system was
steadily deteriorating.'
By September, 1931, complete demoralization pervaded
the financial community. Early in the month President Hoov-
er realized the critical need to protect the financial commu-
nity from public panic and forced liquidation. The nature of
his response to the unprecedented crisis was a product of his
personal philosophy and successful bureaucratic career.
For Hoover the greatness of the American way of life
rested upon its unique synthesis of enlightened individualism
'Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board (Washington, D.G.,
1932), pp. 16-20. Commercial and Financial Chronicle, October 17,
1931; Federal Reserve Bulletin, XVII (November, 1931), 607; New
York Times, January 7, 1932; John K. Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929
(Boston, 1954), pp. 184-85; Paul Trescott, Financing American Enter-
prise ( New York, 1966), p. 199.
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and equality of opportunity. His own successful life, from
the agrarian background of" West Branch, Iowa, to the dis-
tinguished political career in Washington, D.C., reflected
American greatness. As a social method, his "American Indi-
vidualism" guaranteed to every member of the community
the right and means to achieve according to his ability. Amer-
ican Individualism also enjoyed the distinction of succeeding
in an age of corporate power and interest-group politics. In
Hoover's estimate, one of the most extraordinary developments
of the Twentieth Century was the growth of voluntary interest
groups in America. More important, these power aggregates
had arisen almost spontaneously. Such cooperation among
these groups represented a blending of self-interest and altru-
ism, and it provided the ideal environment for the flourishing
of individual initiative and equality of opportunity. Though
motived by self-interest, the leaders of these groups. Hoover
firmly believed, were educated, enlightened men capable of
working together to insure American social and economic
progress.^
Government played an important role in Hoover's ideal
system. He believed in the decentralization of institutional
power because he felt that political and economic groups at
the grassroots level were better equipped than distant, cen-
tralized establishments to evaluate local conditions and to
solve local problems. Yet, the most powerful of those central
institutions, the national government, had important obliga-
tions to fulfill. Unfortunately, President Hoover has been un-
justly maligned by most historians. In actuality, he had long
before abandoned laissez-faire strictures upon governmental
activism. Already, he had organized the President's Commit-
tee on Unemployment Relief to seek means of easing the im-
pact of unemployment, and the Federal Drought Relief Com-
mittee to deliver assistance to farmers. Rather than ignore
the ups and downs of the business cycle, as previous admin-
istrations had done, the government. Hoover believed, must
act as the arbiter and coordinator of the interest-group state.
By stimulating the creation of cooperatively-controlled volun-
tary economic institutions, and by regulating their activ-
^Herbert Hoover, The New Day (Stanford, Calif., 1928), p. 5; Her-
bert Hoover, American Imlividualisni (New York, 1922), pp. 9, 41-45.
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ity through committees of governmental and business officials,
the government could guarantee the survival of the non-
coercive, individualistic society.^
Nevertheless, the President remained keenly aware of the
threat government posed to American Individualism. Because
of the regulatory responsibilities that accompanied the devel-
opment of the industrial state, the government had come to
represent the single most potent element in American society.
In stimulating cooperation and in curbing abuses, the gov-
ernment could only strengthen the nation's bénéficient social
system. On the other hand, any impulses to expand the
authority of the government were dangerous. As an objective,
detached arbiter in the economy, the government perpetuated
individualism; as an active competitor in the economy, it
would destroy the American way of life."
Hoover's successful pre-presidential career had confirmed,
in his own mind, the main tenets of this philosophy. While
leading the American Relief Administration after the war, he
had relied upon voluntary contributions and cooperation
among charitable organizations, such as the Red Cross and
the Friends Service Committee, to sustain his successful ef-
forts to provide food for an impoverished Europe. As Secre-
tary of Commerce, he had vigorously assisted all attempts to
create a political economy dominated by enlightened interest
groups. Farm cooperatives, trade associations and councils,
labor unions, and professional organizations all exemplified
the development of mutual cooperation, and for Hoover the
prosperity of the 1920s confirmed their beneficial impact on
the economy.'' Because of his philosophy and experience, it
was quite natural that in responding to 'the financial crisis of
1931, and the depression in general. Hoover would draw upon
his past and attempt to implement a voluntary program of
cooperation among bankers to end the cycle of forced liquida-
'^Herbert Hoover, American Individualism, p. 46; William S. Myers,
ed.. The State Papers and Other Public Writings of Herbert Hoover
(New York, 1934), Volume I, p. 382.
•"Herbert Hoover, American Individualism, pp. 52-54; William S.
Myers, State Papers, Volume I, pp. 502-04.
•'"Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover (New York, 1952),
Volume H, pp. 20-23, 63, 169-173.
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tion and stimulate the systematic expansion of credit.
On September 8 the President told Eugene Meyer, Gov-
ernor of the Federal Reserve Roard, that cooperative action
by the financial community might stabilize the chaotic eco-
nomic conditions, calm the public, relieve the defiationary
pressures on the banks, and eventually initiate an economic
expansion. Meyer quickly acquainted each chairman of the
twelve Federal Reserve Ranks with Hoover's suggestion and
asked them all to give it careful consideration." At a meeting
of the Federal Reserve Advisory Council on September 15,
the President carried his plan a step further by proposing the
creation of a voluntary credit pool to which private bankers
would subscribe $500,000,000 in capital. Meyer was skep-
tical of the proposal, considering it an inadequate means
with which to confront the broad dimensions of the problem.
Instead, he urged Hoover to revive the War Finance Cor-
poration and endow it with the massive resources of the fed-
eral government.' President Hoover rejected the proposal.
He was no doctrinaire ideologue willing to resist expansions
of federal authority at all costs, but simply hoped that in the
two months before the convening of the Seventy-second Con-
gress an effective private credit organization might be formed
to alleviate the crisis and place the country on the road to
recovery. The President fully realized that if this proved un-
successful, the federal government would have to intervene
directly to ease the crisis.^
«Theodore G. Joslin, Hoover Off the Record (New York, 1934),
pp. 131-33.
'Eugene Meyer, "From Laissez-Faire with William Graham Simmer
to the R.F.G." Public Policy, V (1946), 24.
"Hoover's attitude toward revival of the War Finance Corporation is
a controversial matter, despite the historical consensus which resulted
from an article written by Gerald Nash ( "Herbert Hoover and the
Origins of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XLVI (December, 1959), 455-468.). Nash con-
cluded that Hoover resisted the revival bitterly until tlie last moment.
Unfortimately, Nash seems to have accepted uncritically Eugene Meyer's
claims that it was he, not Hoover, who was responsible for the R.F.C.
A survey of the Ogden Mills Papers at the Library of Congress, the
George Harrison Papers at Columbia University, and the Herbert Hoov-
er Papers at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library reveals a differ-
ent picture. Hoover did prefer the National Credit Corporation to the
revival of the War Finance GoqDoration, but he was by no means a
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Most important in his decision to postpone organization
of the War Finance Corporation was Hoover's philosophical
revulsion from governmental intervention into the economy.
The spector of the War Finance Corporation may have re-
called to Hoover's mind the images of a war economy and
the all pervasive role assumed by the government during that
period. Although he allowed that agencies of governmental
control were justifiable when emergency conditions threat-
ened national survival, he felt their extension into the peace-
time economy would most certainly spell the downfall of
America's unique society.*" Rather than risk such a catas-
trophe. Hoover preferred to grant voluntarism one last
chance to prove itself. Only when private resources had been
exhausted would he resort to federal planning and control.
After three weeks of pleading and promises, Covernor
of the Federal Reserve Board Meyer persuaded a group of
New York bankers to meet with the President in Washington,
D.C. Aware of Hoover's intentions, they privately agreed
during the automobile trip from New York not to provide
any emergency credit agency. They wanted the federal gov-
ernment to directly channel its resources into the nation's
financial establishments.'" On October 4 Hoover presented
his ideas to them. First, he urged bankers to create immedi-
ately a privately-controlled $500,000,000 credit pool to redis-
coiint the sound but frozen assets of banks caught in the cycle
of forced liquidation. To supplement the activities of the
credit association, the President hoped to secure a relaxation
of the eligibility requirements of the Federal Reserve System.
vociferous opponent of the VV.F.C. Hoping to preclude the calling of
a special session of Congress to revive the W.F.C., and hoping that
governmental intervention might be avoided, he did opt for the N.C.C.,
but he also approved immediate drafting of the R.F.C. legislation. The
President was quite willing to support a revival of the War Finance
Corporation once the National Credit Corporation had been tried. See
the New York Times, October 7, 1931; George Harrison to Herbert
Hoover, October 7, 1931, Ogden Mills Papers, Library of Congress;
Congressional Record, LXXV (July 5, 1932), 14602; Herbert Hoover
to George Harrison, October 5, 1931, George Harrison Papers, Golumbia
University.
^Herbert Hoover, American Individualivn, pp. 2, 30-31, 47-49.
'"Eugene Meyer, Unpublished manuscript, Columbia University Oral
Research Office, p. 614.
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Tlie President hoped these measures would liquefy the posi-
tions of many banks and enable them to cope with the emerg-
ency. The bankers, realizing that the financial situation sur-
passed their own willingness or ability to solve it independ-
ently of the federal government, resisted Hoover's proposal.
The President then promised that if, in the next two months,
the credit association failed to bring stability, he would ask
Congress to revive the War Financing Corporation. Only
with this assurance of impending governmental intervention
did the bankers agree to organize the private credit associa-
tion."
George Harrison, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, quickly organized a committee of leading New
York bankers to formulate plans for the credit corporation.
The committee began work and quickly received a pledge
of $150,000,000 from the member banks of the New York
Clearing House Association.''' On October 13, the committee
announced die creation of the National Credit Corporation.
The new Corporation was authorized to issue up to
$1,000,000,000 in debentures, of which the nation's banks were
e.xpected to supply $500,000,000.'"'' Any bank could join, pro-
vided it subscribed two per cent of its net time and demand
deposits to the association. The Corporation's board of direc-
tors consisted of the leading banker from each of the twelve
Federal Reserve Districts. Structurally, the Corporation was
regionally decentralized into local associations in each Fed-
eral Reserve District. Each director organized local associa-
tions and local loan committees in his district. Upon sub-
scribing to the gold notes of the new Corporation, any bank
could apply to its local association for a loan; if approved,
the national organization was to disburse the necessary
"Herbert Hoover to George Harrison, October 5, 1931, George Har-
rison Papers, Columbia University.
''•^New York Times, October 8, 1931.
'""The National Credit Corporation with the New York Trust Com-
pany as Agent of tlie Loan," Debenture Agreement, October 15, 1931,
National Archives, Records Group 56, Department of the Treasury,
National Gredit Corporation; New York Times, October 18, 1931;
"Gertificate of Incorporation of the National Gredit Gorporation," Octo-
ber 13, 1931, National Archives, Records Group 56, Department of the
Treasury, National Gredit Gorporation.
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funds."
The National Credit Corporation represented the ulti-
mate embodiment of Hoover's personal philosophy. Far from
adhering to laissez-faire, the federal government had stimu-
lated private initiatives to achieve recovery. At the same time,
the government had restrained itself by not entering the mar-
ket as a competitor. In calling upon the bankers to organize
and operate the credit pool. Hoover expressed his optimistic
belief in the efficacy of cooperative action. And the Corpora-
tion's organizational framework, vesting the local branches
with complete control over the loan-making process, coincided
with his belief in the viability of decentralized power struc-
tures. For Hoover and his associates the National Credit
Association precluded government intervention, and was thus
the "American way to assist business . . ,'"" His ideas, how-
ever, were predicated upon the willingness of bankers to com-
mit themselves to full scale cooperation; such unity was not
forthcoming.
Hoover's suspicions about the depth of the Bankers' com-
mitment to the Corporation were quickly aroused following
its formal organization. Although pleased with its prompt
establishment, the President was dissatisfied with the delays
in the actual disbursement of funds. During the last week
of October and the first week of November Hoover and his
Undersecretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills began sending
telegrams to the national and local leaders of the Corpora-
tion, criticizing them for their procrastination.'® The officials
of the Corporation apologized for the delays and claimed that
organization of the local associations was consuming more
""Plan of Organization of the National Credit Corporation," Unpub-
lished manuscript, October 14, 1931 and "National Credit Corporation
Board of Directors," Unpublished manuscript. National Archives, Records
Group 56, Department of tlie Treasury, National Credit Corporation.
^^New York Times, October 7, 1931.
'"Herbert Hoover to George H. Reynolds, November 6, 1931, Herbert
Hoover Presidential Library, Presidential Papers, Financial, National
Credit Corporation. Folder G in this collection of the Hoover Papers in-
cludes many telegrams from Hoover and Mills to Individual bankers
urging them to move forward with the National Gredit Corporation pro-
gram.
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time than had heen anticipated." Finally, on November 7
the directors announced that the National Credit Corporation
had formally opened its doors for husiness, although final or-
ganization still had not heen completed in all of the Federal
Reserve Districts."*
Despite his displeasure with the early operations of the
National Credit Corporation, President Hooyer was satisfied
with the impact his proposal apparently had on the economy.
Bank failures in October dropped weekly after the announce-
ment of the plan, and suspensions for the first half of Novem-
ber were among the lowest of the year.'" Late in October,
1931 die prices of common and preferred stocks and of cor-
porate bonds rallied.^" At this stage Hoover had every reason
to believe that the National Credit Corporation was going to
be a success, and that a revival of the War Finance Corpora-
tion would prove to be unnecessary.
Unfortunately, the economic upturn resulted, in even
further delays in the operation of the National Credit Cor-
poration. Hoping that the financial recovery would relieve
the pressure on the Corporation to make some immediate
loans, the officers decided in the first week of November to
suspend their first call for a ten per cent installment on all
of the commitments made by member banks. Consequently,
the Corporation's officers relaxed for several weeks and post-
poned making loans, cautiously hoping that the National
Credit Corporation could be dissolved without undertaking
e.xtensive loan commitonents. '^ By December, they still had
made less than $10,000,000 in loans."
"Mortimer Buckner to Ogden Mills, October 26, 1931, National
Archives, Records Group 56, Department of the Treasury, National
Credit Corporation; Ogden Mills to Walter Frew, October 30, 1931,
Ogden Mills Papers, Library of Congress.
'''New York Times, November 7, 1931.
"'New York Times, November 9 and December 19, 1931.
'"Federal Reserve Bulletin, XVII (December, 1931), 665.
^'Mortimer Buckner to Theodore Joslin, November 17, 1931, Herbert
Hoover Presidential Library, Presidential Papers, Financial, National
Credit Corporation; George M. Reynolds to Herbert Hoover, November
4, 1931, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Presidential Papers,
Financial, National Credit Gorporation.
^^U.S. Gongress, Senate, Gommittee on Banking and Currency, Hear-
ings on S. 1, Creation of a Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 72nd
Gong., 1st Sess., 1932, p. 68.
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Their hopes, however, were quickly shattered. Whether
the October rally represented a seasonal fluctuation, a minor
adjustment after the serious declines which had ensued since
England left the gold standard, or the response to a tempo-
rary rejuvenation of public confidence by announcement of
the credit pool, it was shortlived, collapsing late in Novem-
ber. Bank failures again reached alarming numbers, and
stock and bond prices entered another period of decline.^ ^
The National Credit Corporation had failed.
President Hoover, however, was not responsible for the
failure. The cautiousness of the bankers inhibited the actual
operations of the Corporation. As originally proposed, the
National Credit Corporation was part of a financial program
which also embraced the broadening of the Federal Reserve
eligibility requirements. Under these provisions, bankers
hoped that the frozen collateral the Corporation acquired
from its loans might be rediscounted by the Federal Reserve
Banks. But when the measure to reform the Federal Reserve
met stiff resistance from Congressional Democrats in Novem-
ber, 1931, it became evident that such rediscounting policies
might not be forthcoming.^'' By loaning their pooled assets
to threatened banks, then, the solvent members of the Cor-
poration would indirectly be accepting slow and frozen assets
into their portfolios, a development which the bankers studi-
ously avoided. In view of 'the cautiousness of the financial
community. President Hoover called for the establishment of
a Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
In proposing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Hoover had suspended his personal creed. The National
Credit Corporation represented the last attempt by the Re-
publican President to solve the depression by voluntary ac-
tion in the private sector. The National Credit Corporation
had been an utter failure as a total solution to the depression.
That failure, however, marked a watershed in the history of
the federal government, for when Hoover abandoned the
"^Federal Reserve Bulletin, XVII (December, 1931), 665; New York
Times, December 19, 1931 and January 1, 7, and 11, 1932.
•^•S. E. Harris, "Banking and Currency Legislation," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, XLVI (May, 1932), 547-48; U. S. Congress, Hearings on
S. 1., pp. 176-77.
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National Credit Corporation he also abandoned realistic hopes
for an active but limited federal government. Contrary to
historical consensus, Herbert Hoover was a sensitive man
willing to undertake whatever measures he believed necessary
to bring recovery. Herbert Hoover, once the nation's most
articulate spokesman for voluntarism and a circumscribed fed-
eral government, had directed America, with the termination
of the National Credit Corporation and the creation of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, toward an embryonic
governmental-business relationship which would quickly
evolve into the New Deal.
Although the proposal appears mild when compared with
the vast changes which have occurred since 1932 in the re-
sponsibilities of the federal government. Hoover had actually
taken' an extraordinary step forward in the history of Ameri-
can public policy. Indeed, the tragedy of Hoover's reputa-
tion lies in the comparison historians have made between the
Republican president and those presidents who followed him.
Hoover becomes a landmark figure in the history of American
politics when one compares him with his predecessors. In
1931, for the first time, an American President had admitted
that the federal government was responsible for maintaining
the economic welfare of the nation, for controlling the oper-
ation of the business cycle. For Hoover the processes of
natural liquidation and deflation were too severe and too pro-
ductive of suffering and social injustice to make laissez-faire
policies tenable. The depression was so serious, and its im-
pact so widespread, that it constituted an unprecedented na-
tional emergency; the privately-owned financial, commercial
and industrial sectors of the economy were powerless to stop
the decline. They simply did not possess the vision or the
economic resources necessary to take efliective action. At that
point President Hoover made a momentous break with the
past. With his proposal, on December 7, 1931, for the crea-
tion of a Reconstruction Finance Corporation, President
Hoover initiated a movement leading directly to the New
Deal. In reality, the New Deal began not in the spring of
1933 but in the winter of 1931-32 when Herbert Hoover
transcended voluntarism and brought on a direct intervention
of the federal government into the economy.

